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This paper provides a review of the design and experience 
of risk-based pension fund supervision in several 
countries that have been leaders in the development of 
these methods. The utilization of risk-based methods 
originates primarily in the supervision of banks. In 
recent years it has increasingly been extended to other 
types of financial intermediaries including pension funds 
and insurers. The trend toward risk-based supervision 
of pensions is closely associated with movement toward 
the integration of pension supervision with that of 
banking and other financial services into a single national 
authority. Although similar in concept to the techniques 
This paper—a product of the Financial Policy Development Unit in the Financial Systems Department (FPDFS)—is 
part of a larger project on risk-based supervision of pension funds managed by the department, in collaboration with the 
International Organization of Pension Supervisors (IOPS). Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web 
at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at rrocha@worldbank.org, gbrunner@worldbank.org, and 
rhinz@worldbank.org. 
developed in banking, the application to pension funds 
has required modifications, particularly for defined 
contribution funds that transfer investment risk to fund 
members. The countries examined provide a range of 
experiences that illustrate both the diversity of pension 
systems and approaches to risk-based supervision, 
but also a commonality of the focus on sound risk 
management and effective supervisory outcomes. The 
paper provides a description of pension supervision in 
Australia, Denmark, Mexico and the Netherlands, and an 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past several decades privately managed pensions have evolved from their 
origins as a supplemental form of deferred compensation to become an important, and in 
some cases central, element of social insurance systems.  Their supervision has made a 
similar transition to meet the requirements of this new role, evolving from an initial 
emphasis on ensuring compliance with tax laws and labor contracts and relatively simple 
methods to limiting investment risk, towards a much more comprehensive approach 
designed to ensure proper management of all the risks associated with complex 
institutions relied on to provide secure sources of retirement income. 
The wave of innovation and reforms in Latin America and Central and Eastern 
Europe beginning in the early 1980s transformed pension funds from primarily employer 
sponsored defined benefit (DB) arrangements into more diverse forms including most 
significantly the emergence of special purpose financial intermediaries operating on a 
defined contribution (DC) basis. This largely removed the capacity to rely on employers 
to guarantee outcomes placing financial risks squarely on the shoulders of members.   
This transition shifted the nexus of supervision from controlling agency risks to 
managing systemic financial and operational risks. Initially the new supervision regimes 
were based on simple portfolio limits with very pro-active compliance enforcement.   
Bounding downside risk over short periods through investment controls was the primary 
concern. The risk-return efficiency or effective capital allocation were very secondary 
considerations. 
By the beginning of the new millennium several factors combined to accelerate these 
changes in supervision methods. Private pension funds in a number of countries 
accumulated asset levels exceeding those of more traditional financial institutions, in 
some cases more than 100% of GDP, leading to a commensurate increase in attention to 
their systemic importance.  A “perfect storm” of rapidly declining interest rates 
coincident with collapsing equity prices exposed the fragility of the loose funding 
requirements for the remaining DB schemes.  Concerns about the capacity of the new DC 
plans to produce adequate levels of retirement income also focused attention on the 
efficacy of their design and operation. This led a number of countries to begin to adopt 
supervision systems based on various risk-based approaches that established new 
standards for the operation of pension funds and guided the conduct of their oversight 
activities. 
The objective of this paper is to review the experience in four of the pioneers in 
developing risk-based supervision for pension funds: Australia, Denmark, Mexico, and 
the Netherlands.  These countries each have large well established pension systems that 
provide a useful initial review because they constitute a representative sample of the 
characteristics of pension systems worldwide, including occupational and open pension 
funds as well as both defined benefit and defined contribution arrangements. The paper 
draws on individual country studies that form part of a joint project of the World Bank 
and the International Organization of Pension Supervisors (IOPS), as well as discussions 
with pension supervisors and market participants in these countries.  The reader is 
referred to the case studies for a more detailed analysis of individual countries.
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The paper is structured as follows.  The second section reviews the origins of risk-
based supervision in banking and insurance, and the progress that has been achieved in 
developing further the risk-based approach under the Basel II and Solvency II   3
agreements.  The third section provides an overview of the pension systems of the four 
countries and the factors that have motivated the introduction of risk-based supervision in 
these countries.  The fourth section – the core of the paper – provides a more in depth 
discussion of the main elements of risk-based supervision of pension funds in the four 
countries.  This is followed by a very preliminary assessment of the impact of the new 
supervisory approach on the sectors, as well as some observations on the challenges that 
supervisors will face in the future.  Finally, the sixth section concludes and draws some 
preliminary lessons for other countries. 
 
II. CONCEPTUAL ORIGINS OF RISK-BASED SUPERVISION - BASEL II AND SOLVENCY II 
 
The movement towards risk-based supervisory approaches can be traced to the 
development of early warning systems for banks.  The earliest of these systems was the 
CAMEL system for risk rating adopted by the United States in the 1980s. In 1988 the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision implemented the Capital Adequacy Accord 
(Basel I) which provided a risk-based framework for assessing the capital adequacy of 
banks to cover credit risks.  The development of this framework was an important step in 
the path towards risk-based supervision. It sought to ensure an adequate level of capital in 
the banking system by applying weighting to credit exposures based on broad risk 
classifications.  
During the 1990s a number of supervisors implemented risk assessment and early 
warning systems.  In 1993 the Bank of Italy implemented an off-site monitoring system 
called PATROL; in 1997 the German Federal Supervisory Office introduced an early 
warning and monitoring system called BAKIS.  In the same year the French Banking 
Commission introduced an off-site supervisory bank rating system called ORAP.  In 
1998 the Financial Service Authority in the United Kingdom introduced its RATE model, 
a comprehensive bank risk rating system, and the Dutch National Bank (DNB) 
implemented a comprehensive system called RAST which has evolved into the FIRM 
Model applied to all financial entities regulated by DNB today. 
In 1999 the Basel Committee began the process of replacing the Basel I Accord with 
a more contemporary framework which requires banks to improve risk management and 
corporate governance in conjunction with improved supervision and transparency.  The 
new framework known as Basel II is designed to encourage good risk management by 
tying regulatory capital requirements to the results of internal systems and processes, thus 
creating incentives for improvements in risk management. In addition to making the 
calculation of regulatory capital more risk sensitive and recognizing the quality of 
internal risk management systems, the framework added two pillars to the model – the 
supervisory review process and the market discipline.  The three pillars of the new model 
are shown in Figure 1.   4
 
Figure 1: The Three Pillars of Basel II 
Pillar 1  Pillar 2  Pillar 3 
Minimum Capital Requirements  Supervisory Review Process  Market Discipline 
Risk-based capital rule reflecting: 
1 
• Market risk 
• Credit risk 
• Operational risk  
• Regulatory compliance 
• Reporting obligations leading 
to more transparency and 
accountability 
• Meaningful disclosure 
Note:  1) The interest rate risk on the banking book (loans, deposits) is not included in pillar 1 of Basel II, but in pillar 
2.  However, it is included in pillar 1 of Solvency II. 
 
The Basel II framework provides banks with a choice between a standardized 
approach to calculating credit risk using specified risk factors and an internal ratings 
based approach which is subject to explicit approval by the bank supervisor which would 
allow banks to use their internal ratings systems for credit risk. It has been built through a 
process of extensive exploration by regulators of emerging industry practices in risk 
management and considerable testing and calibration.   
The framework requires implementation of an effective and comprehensive risk 
management system.  It is envisaged that banks will set up a proper organizational 
structure, policies, procedures and limits for credit, market and operational risk.  Banks 
are also required to have an integrated approach to risk management that covers the risks 
in particular business segments as well as the bank as a whole. 
The second pillar, supervisory review, allows supervisors to evaluate a banks’ 
assessment of its own risks and assure themselves that the banks processes are robust. 
Supervisors will have the opportunity to assess whether a bank understands its risk 
profile and is sufficiently capitalized against its risks.  This pillar will encourage adoption 
of risk focused internal audits, strengthened management information systems and the 
development of risk management units. 
The third pillar – market discipline – ensures that the market is provided with 
sufficient information to allow it to undertake its own assessment of banks’ risks.  It is 
intended to strengthen incentives for improved risk management through greater 
transparency. This should allow market participants to better understand the risks 
inherent in each bank and to ultimately support well managed banks at the expense of 
poorly managed banks. 
The movement towards greater risk focus is also being reflected in the insurance 
industry.  The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) is currently 
working to develop a common international framework for assessing the solvency of 
insurers.  At a regional level work is underway in Europe on the Solvency II project 
which aims to adopt a risk-based approach to capital requirements for insurance 
companies; and introduce qualitative requirements for senior management, risk 
management, model validation and internal controls.  There will also be recognition of 
internal modeling in collaboration with the actuarial profession. Solvency II will involve 
a three pillar approach similar to Basel II, introducing a supervisory review process and 
enhanced transparency. 
The current solvency framework in Europe dating from the early 1970s defines 
capital requirements for insurers in terms of solvency margins typically based on simple 
rules applied to technical provisions or premiums.  Under Solvency II the first pillar will   5
define the resources that a company needs to be considered solvent.  It will define two 
thresholds for capital.  The Solvency Capital Requirement will set a threshold for 
supervisory action and a Minimum Capital Requirement will provide a basis for stronger 
action or even withdrawal of the company’s license to write new business.  As with Basel 
II, the capital requirement can be calculated using either a simple standardized model or 
an internal model which has been approved by the supervisor. Pillar 2 will take into 
account qualitative measures of risk control focusing on risk management processes, 
individual risk capital assessment, and aspects of operational risk, including stress testing.  
Pillar 3 will address disclosure requirements incorporating more consistent international 
accounting standards. In many European countries which operate DB pension schemes or 
guarantee arrangements which involve technical reserving, the rules applying to 
insurance companies may also apply to pension entities. 
Across the globe the trend is inexorably moving towards improved risk management 
based on the three key elements outlined in Figure 2.  Firstly, institutions themselves are 
focusing on improving their own risk management.  They are developing risk 
management strategies and they are measuring and assessing risk in a more 
comprehensive manner. In many institutions this involves the creation of dedicated risk 
management units. They are implementing controls to ensure that risk management 
polices are followed and are ensuring that risk management information is presented to 
management and board in a meaningful fashion. 
Supervisors are responding to this by building up their ability to assess risk.  The 
basic tools of on-site and off-site supervision are taking on a risk focus, and specialist risk 
units are being created with expertise to tackle complex issues.  Many regulators are 
encouraging improved risk management by implementing regulatory standards and 
providing guidance. Finally, more external parties are being encouraged to take a role in 
the risk assessment process, either through broadening the role of some traditional 
players like auditors and actuaries, or through encouragement of greater scrutiny by 
outside parties through greater transparency of reporting. 
 
III. INTRODUCTION OF RISK-BASED SUPERVISION FOR PENSIONS 
1. Overview of the Four Pension Systems 
This section provides an overview of the private pension systems of the four 
countries examined to provide an understanding of the factors that motivated the 
introduction of risk-based supervision.  Further background information on the pension 
systems of these countries is provided in the individual country papers.
2 
As shown in Table 1, all of the countries have mandatory or quasi-mandatory private 
pension systems.  In Australia and Mexico, contributions to private pension plans are 
imposed by legislation.  In the Netherlands and Denmark, contributions take place in the 
context of collective labor agreements. These are classified as quasi-mandatory, because 
most workers are covered by these agreements.  The mandatory or quasi-mandatory 
nature of contributions results in high coverage rates except for Mexico.  The lower 
coverage ratio in Mexico, despite the legal obligation to contribute, is explained by the 
large share of the labor force in the informal sector and the lower number of active 
contributors relative to the total universe of pension fund members.
3     6
The pension systems in these countries are very large, with assets exceeding 100 
percent of GDP in all cases, except for Mexico.  The relatively small size of assets 
relative to GDP in the Mexican case is due to the lower coverage ratio and the fact that 
the Mexican system is much younger, having started operations only in 1998.   However, 
the mandatory nature of contributions to individual accounts implies that that private 
pension system will continue growing at fast rates and increase its share in the financial 
sector. 
Three countries have a large number of funds, ranging from 111 in Denmark to 
1,000 in Australia and these funds may operate more than one pension plan.  Many of 
these are occupational funds structured as non-profit trusts or foundations that were 
originally created on a voluntary basis and have been operating for several decades.   
They include single funds and larger multi-employer or industry-wide funds. Australia 
and Denmark also have several for-profit commercial institutions managing pension 
funds – including life insurance companies in the Danish case.   
 
Table 1:  Main Characteristics of the Four Private Pension Systems, Dec. 2005 
 Mandate 
Coverage 



















80 124  111    Occupational 
and open 
1 
Mostly DC with 
absolute return 
guarantee (DB-like) 
Australia Mandatory  90  104  1,004    Occupational 
and open 
2  DC 
Mexico Mandatory 29  8  18  Open  DC with ceiling on 
downside risk (VaR) 
Notes:  1) Denmark: 44 corporate funds, 30 industry-wide funds, 37 life insurance companies;  
2) Australia: 681 corporate funds, 86 industry-wide funds, 194 retail funds, 43 public sector funds.  The figures do not 
include small funds. 
Sources: Hinz and Van Dam (2006), Andersen and Van Dam (2006), Thompson (2006), Bernstein and Chumacero 
(2007), Rofman and Luchetti (2006) 
 
Mexico has only 18 funds currently licensed.  The difference in the number of funds 
is a result of the different origins and characteristics of the Mexican system.  The 
Australian, Danish and Dutch systems have their roots in voluntary arrangements with 
employers. Most funds were initially established with liberal licensing/authorization rules 
designed to encourage participation and coverage. By contrast, the Mexican system was 
established as a mandatory system of open funds subject to a strict regulatory framework, 
including much stricter licensing rules.
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Dutch pension funds manage primarily DB plans – the Netherlands has been one the 
few countries that has successfully resisted the move towards DC plans.  The Danish 
system is a DC system that offers benefit guarantees and operates on a risk-sharing (or 
profit-sharing) basis.  The guarantees introduce a core liability and the risk of insolvency 
of the provider.  Therefore, the Danish system exhibits some of the characteristics of a 
defined-benefit system, although it operates with more flexible rules than pure defined-  7
benefit systems and seems to be moving in the direction of DC plans with fewer 
guarantees. 
5 
Australian pension funds manage primarily traditional DC plans with no formal 
guarantees.  There are still some DB plans, but these are mostly restricted to public sector 
funds, and account for a small share of total assets. Australia best represents a pure 
defined contribution system. 
Mexican funds, by contrast, manage their DC plans under a new regulatory 
framework that includes a limit on downside risk defined by a ceiling on the daily 
absolute Value at Risk (VaR).  This is a significant departure from the setup introduced in 
Chile and other countries in Latin America and Central Europe that relied on quantitative 
portfolio restrictions to manage risks.  Most of these countries have introduced minimum 
relative return guarantees that intensify herding behavior and lead pension funds to base 
their investment strategies on tracking errors or relative VaRs vis-à-vis the benchmark 
portfolio.  Pension fund managers in these countries are more concerned with relative risk 
(the risk of deviating from the benchmark and facing a capital call to honor the relative 
return guarantee) than absolute risk.  The Mexican experiment is both innovative and 
controversial, and is being followed with interest in other countries. 
2. Factors Motivating the Adoption of Risk-Based Supervision in Pension Systems 
Some of the factors that have motivated the introduction of risk-based supervision of 
pension funds are common to all the four countries, while others seem to be country-
specific.  Table 2 summarizes the motivating factors that have been identified in the 
individual country studies.  
Preventing under-funding of DB plans was a strong factor motivating the adoption of 
risk-based supervision in the Netherlands.  Dutch funds enjoyed the equity boom in the 
1990s and started taking contribution holidays when funding ratios reached levels 
considered as high.  However, these funding ratios proved insufficient to absorb the 
adverse price movements in the early 2000s – the crash of the equity market combined 
with the drop in interest rates led several funds to become under-funded or only 
marginally funded.  Regulators interpreted the outcome as indicating a weakness in the 
supervisory approach that was perceived as lacking sufficient foresight and concern for 
the risks facing the institutions.  
The introduction of a more risk-based approach to supervision in Denmark was also 
motivated by a concern with the solvency of pension providers, but the surrounding 
conditions were different from those in the Netherlands.   First, the new Danish “traffic 
light” system (explained in more detail below) preceded the equity crash in the early 
2000s.  By the time equity prices collapsed and interest rates declined, the new system 
was already in place.  Second, the new system was introduced as a quid pro quo for a 
more liberal investment regime in which the ceiling on equity investments was raised to 
70%.  Danish funds were allowed to make riskier investments provided that they held 
sufficient capital to absorb the risk.  Third, the Danish system operates on a risk-sharing 
basis, which means that the system has buffers than can absorb at least part of the adverse 
price movements.  These differences imply that the first motivating factor was more 
important in the Netherlands than in Denmark.  However, there was still concern with 
provider solvency in Denmark, justifying the inclusion of this factor.   8
Concern with adverse price movements was also one of the motivating factors in 
Mexico, although the Mexican system is a DC system where the investment risk is 
shifted to the individual and there is little risk of provider insolvency.  The policy concern 
in Mexico was not the risk of provider insolvency, but the exposure of retiring workers to 
extreme downside losses and the extreme volatility of benefits across cohorts.
6  It is also 
interesting to note that, as in the Danish case, the adoption of a VaR ceiling in Mexico 
and the introduction of strict risk management rules were a quid pro quo for the 
introduction of a more liberal investment regime that allowed pension fund managers to 
make riskier investments and use derivatives,.  
 
Table 2:  Factors Motivating the Adoption of Risk-Based Supervision 
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(or DC plans 
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guarantees) 







to members of 






























Netherlands  X      X X X 
Denmark  X    X X X X 
Australia        X X X 
Mexico   X  X  X  x   
  
The search for efficiency gains was also one of the main motivating factors in 
Denmark and Mexico.  In both cases, the investment regime was liberalized and pension 
funds allowed to investment more in equity and other assets perceived as risky.  In 
Mexico, pension funds were allowed to use derivatives, subject to certification by the 
supervisor. The relaxation of the investment regime was motivated by the perception that 
pension funds were constrained below the efficient investment frontier and that there was 
scope for longer term improvements in the risk-return trade-off.  The relaxation of 
investment rules was accompanied by other rules designed to strengthen risk 
management and constrain excessive risk-taking. 
The need to establish rules that enabled pension funds to take advantage of the 
increasing sophistication and complexity of financial instruments and markets was a 
motivating factor in all the four countries.  This reflects a more general recognition by 
financial supervisors worldwide that it is no longer feasible to monitor all of the 
operations of financial institutions, and that a more effective approach entails ensuring 
that these institutions have sound risk management practices and internal controls.     
In the Netherlands, Denmark, and Australia, the adoption of risk-based supervision 
was also driven by the need to allocate scarce supervisory resources efficiently.   
Especially in Australia and the Netherlands, supervisors need to monitor a large number 
of institutions.  A traditional, compliance-based supervision would be either too costly or 
ineffective in these cases.  The risk-based approach allows supervisors to focus their   9
scarce resources in the institutions exposed to greater risks and/or with weaker risk 
management capacity.  This factor was less important in Mexico, where only 18 funds are 
allowed to operate.
7      
The integration of financial supervisory functions in one entity also seems to have 
been a motivating factor in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Australia.  The adoption of 
risk-based supervision in pensions seems to have been accelerated in the countries that 
integrated their agencies and adopted the same basic supervision approach to all financial 
institutions.  There was in these cases an accelerated transfer of supervisory “know-how” 
from banking and/or insurance supervision to pension supervision.  Mexico was again the 
exception, as the supervisory agency (Comision Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el 
Retiro – Consar) was a single entity when the new approach was adopted and has 
remained a single entity since then.       
 
 
IV. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF RISK-BASED SUPERVISION FOR PENSIONS 
1. Common Objectives and Elements of Design 
As discussed in section II, one of the main objectives of risk-based supervision in 
banking and insurance is to ensure that institutions adopt sound risk management 
procedures and hold appropriate levels of capital.  Regulators and policy-makers are 
aware that many leading institutions have already adopted good risk management 
practices and some companies would already be able to meet the more demanding 
requirements of Basel II and Solvency II.  These financial institutions recognize that 
sound risk management practices are in the interest of stakeholders and are rewarded by 
the market, as indicated by the growing consideration of the quality of internal risk 
management by rating companies.
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Pension supervisors face challenges that are in many aspects similar to those faced 
by bank and insurance supervisors.  They recognize the need to evolve to an approach 
that emphasizes sound risk management by the supervised institutions, in order to 
strengthen financial stability and ensure more efficient outcomes for pensioners.  They 
are also aware that several pension funds in their countries have already started adopting 
good risk management practices.  The challenge that pension supervisors face is to ensure 
that all licensed institutions comply with minimum standards of risk management and 
hold appropriate levels of capital (in the systems where this is relevant).   
In order to examine they way pension supervisors have addressed this challenge, it is 
useful to consider Figure 2 that identifies the three main groups of players involved in the 
overall architecture of risk management.  The first group consists of the supervised 
institutions.  The second group is the supervisory agency, and the third consists of other 
market participants that may have the capacity to influence the decisions and actions of 
pension funds.  These include auditors, actuaries, fund members, rating companies, and 
market analysts.          
One of the main objectives of risk-based supervision is to ensure sound risk 
management at the institutional level.  As indicated in the left box of Figure 2, the 
capacity of the institution to identify, measure, and manage all the relevant risks, would 
be reflected in the presence of a sound internal architecture of risk management that 
includes a reasonable risk management strategy, evidence of Board involvement in risk   10
management, the existence of risk management functions performed by competent, 
independent, and accountable professionals, and proper internal controls.   
The question is what tools supervisors have to ensure these outcomes.  As indicated in the 
right box of Figure 2, the broad elements of the supervisory toolkit include the regulations issued 
by the supervisor, including direct regulations focused on the risk management architecture and 
risk management procedures, a risk-based capital rule (in the environments where this is 
relevant), and a risk-scoring model that guides supervisory strategies and procedures.  In addition, 
the supervisory agency will organize itself consistent with the requirements of these elements by 
establishing some units focused on managing the relationships with the supervised entities and 
other technical units more specialized in the measurement and analysis of different type of risks.          
 
Figure 2 
The Basic Risk Management Architecture The Basic Risk Management Architecture
For the institution: For the institution:
  Risk management strategy Risk management strategy
  Board committees Board committees
  Risk management functions  Risk management functions 
in the managerial structure in the managerial structure
  Internal controls Internal controls
  Reporting responsibilities Reporting responsibilities
For the supervisor: For the supervisor:
  Regulations, including   Regulations, including  
minimum risk management  minimum risk management 
standards standards
  Risk Risk- -based solvency rule based solvency rule
  Risk scoring model guiding  Risk scoring model guiding 
supervisory actions supervisory actions
  Internal organization of the  Internal organization of the 
agency, with specialist risk  agency, with specialist risk 
units units
Market Discipline:
The contribution of the actuary, auditor,  fund members,        
rating companies, and market analysts to sound risk management
 
 
Finally, the third group of relevant players includes those market participants which 
may contribute to market discipline and the adoption of sound risk management practices 
by the institutions.  The role of some of these players depends on regulations issued by 
the supervisor as well.  For example, the role of the auditor may be enhanced by 
expanding the scope of the audits to include an assessment of the effectiveness of risk 
management systems and internal controls, and imposing whistle-blowing obligations.  
The influence of fund members, rating companies, and other market analysts may be 
strengthened by good accounting, auditing and disclosure rules issued by the supervisor. 
It is possible to relate the main components identified in Figure 2 with the three 
pillars in the Basel II/Solvency II framework.  The risk-based solvency rule constitutes 
the first pillar and is relevant in DB systems or DC systems which offer benefit 
guarantees.  The second pillar represents the supervisory process.  Figure 2 emphasizes 
risk scoring models, because these models have become essential tools around which 
pension supervisors organize their off-site and on-site supervisory actions.  The third 
pillar, market discipline, is directly represented by the third block in Figure 2.  This pillar   11
is expected to play an essential role in the Basel II and Solvency II frameworks, but its 
relevance for pension supervision depends more closely on the particular type of system, 
as discussed below.     
2. Overview of the Main Components of Pension Supervision in the Four Countries  
As illustrated in Table 3, pension supervisors in the four countries have developed 
these tools to varying degrees, reflecting the different environments.  In The Netherlands, 
Denmark, and Australia, the institutions must comply with corporate governance rules 
that emphasize the role and responsibilities of the Board and must also have a risk 
management plan or risk management guidelines, but do not have to adopt a specific 
architecture of risk management.  By contrast, all Mexican pension funds have to adopt a 
very specific and detailed risk management architecture laid out in a specific regulation 
issued by the supervisor.   
The different approach followed in Mexico reflects the particular characteristics of 
the Mexican system, including the much smaller number of relatively homogeneous 
institutions.  It is possible to implement this type of regulation in a system with only 18 
pension funds.  It would be very difficult – and also questionable – to implement this type 
of regulation in a system with 1,000 pension funds, including large and small funds with 
very different capacities.  Supervisors could generate severe inefficiencies by imposing a 
one-size-fits-all type of regulation.  Of course, the build up of risk management capacity 
in the institutions is a supervisory objective in Australia, Denmark, and the Netherlands, 
but supervisors try to achieve this objective through other means, such as the incentive 
effects associated with their risk scoring model or by imposing sanctions on institutions 
with weak capacity to manage risks. 
Risk-based solvency rules are relevant in the Netherlands and Denmark, because of 
the nature of their systems.  Dutch supervisors have recently implemented a detailed and 
formal risk-based solvency rule that addresses longevity, market, credit, currency, and 
interest rate risks and that penalizes asset-liability mismatches.   Denmark has adopted a 
model that can be classified as hybrid.  The formal solvency rule is not risk-based, but is 
complemented by a standard stress test called the “traffic light system” that entails a test 
of the resiliency of the institution to fluctuations in interest rates and asset prices.  The 
Danish traffic light system shares some common elements with the new Dutch solvency 
rule but also has some important differences.  It is not a formal solvency rule, as already 
noted, and is applied in the context of a risk-sharing system, which implies a lower risk of 
insolvency.   Risk-based solvency rules are not relevant in DC systems such as Australia 
and Mexico, but Mexican regulators have adopted a ceiling on daily VaR that limits the 
exposure of DC fund members to downside risk.  
Australia and the Netherlands have made substantial progress in building 
comprehensive risk scoring models that are applied to all financial institutions, with 
adaptations depending on the type of institution.   In the Netherlands, solvency indicators 
are considered as inputs to the risk scoring model, providing a link between the risk-
based capital position and the risk scores.  It is also interesting to note that the Australian 
risk scoring model takes into consideration the institution’s exposure to financial risks 
(and the capacity to manage these risks) in the risk scores, even though it is applied to DC 
plans where financial risks are shifted to the individual members.  The Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) examines the adequacy of investment   12
management processes, including the investment strategies, asset allocation, 
diversification, liquidity needs and performance measurement, monitoring and 
benchmarking.  It looks not only for compliance with the broad investment rules but also 
to how risk management compares to good industry practices.  Denmark and Mexico 
have made only partial progress in this area.  Both countries have developed elements of 
a risk scoring model to guide their supervisory actions, but have not yet developed full 
models. 
 
Table 3:  Main Components of Risk-Based Supervision in the Four Countries 
  Requirements for 












Netherlands Internal  review 
of Board’s 
management of 
long term risks. 
Risk 
management 






















agency;     
Specialized 
pension units and 
specialized ALM 
and Legal units. 
Denmark Board  of 
Directors 




solvency margin  
+  risk-based  
traffic light system 
Partially developed   High  Integrated 
agency;   
Specialized 









solvency rules for 
DC plans 
1 














Mexico Very  specific 
and detailed 
architecture laid 
out in a 
regulation issued 
by the supervisor 
No formal 
solvency rules for 
DC plans; 
However, VaR 
ceilings to limit 
downside risk 
Partially developed: 
Elements of risk 
scoring for operational 









Notes: 1/ Australia imposes basic technical solvency requirements for the remaining DB funds.  The size of solvency buffer 
is assessed as part of PAIRS 
 
Market discipline does not seem to play a very important role in the Netherlands, 
although the disclosure of the fund’s solvency position and its implications for the 
sponsor may impose an element of discipline in single employer funds.  Market discipline 
plays a more important role in Mexico and Denmark, where there is more scope for 
individuals or sponsors to change the provider, and supervisors in both countries ensure a 
high level of disclosure to facilitate comparisons and well-informed decisions.   13
Finally, all the supervisory agencies have reorganized themselves to conduct a type 
of supervision that requires more specialized skills.  In Australia, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands there are units focused on the relationship with the institutions and 
specialized units providing expert/technical support on different types of risks.  The 
Mexican supervisory agency has a particular setup that mirrors the internal risk 
management architecture imposed by regulation. 
 
3. Regulatory Requirements for Risk Management Architecture 
Table 4 provides more detail on the regulatory requirements for the internal risk 
management architecture. Australia, Denmark, and the Netherlands impose some 
requirements on risk management as part of licensing or initial registration procedures.  
This includes the elaboration of a risk management plan or risk management guidelines.  
These requirements are not very detailed, with the supervisors allowing for differences 
depending on the size of the institution.   These countries do not seem to impose specific 
regulatory requirements on the internal risk management architecture, although Dutch 
funds must have an internal body reviewing long term risk management, as well as 
independent risk management functions. 
As mentioned before, Mexican supervisors have followed a different approach, 
issuing a direct regulation that specifies in detail all the elements of the internal risk 
management architecture.  All pension funds must have two Board committees dedicated 
to risk management, one focused on operational risk and the other on financial risk.  Each 
committee must have at least five members, of which are three Board members.  At least 
one of the Board members must be independent.  The other members are the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Risk Officer (CRO).  The CRO heads an 
independent and central risk management unit (UAIR), addressing both operational and 
financial risks, and must report to the Board, the CEO and the supervisor.  The regulation 
specifies in detail the duties and obligations of the CRO, including the interactions with 
other key executives such as the Chief Investment Officer.  The regulation also requires 
the presence of a compliance officer ensuring observance of all the regulations. 
It is difficult to make a comparison of the effectiveness of these two approaches, 
because Australian, Danish, and Dutch supervisors may also induce institutions to adopt 
sound risk management practices through their risk scoring models.  As explained in 
more detail below, risk scoring models measure the exposure of institutions to risk and 
their capacity to manage these risks.  This capacity is assessed in some detail, entailing 
the assessment of the quality of very specific elements of risk management, procedures, 
and control.  Institutions which receive low scores are typically subject to more intensive 
supervision and are pressed to remedy their deficiencies. 
The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) introduced a guidance note 
on risk management to further explain the risk management requirements inserted into 
the legislation in the context of a comprehensive re-licensing program that has resulted in 
a sharp reduction in the number of institutions.  Its supervisors report that several 
institutions could not demonstrate their capacity to prepare or implement a coherent risk 
management plan during the re-licensing process. 
The Australian experience suggests that pension supervisors probably need to 
consider a combination of tools to ensure the introduction of sound risk management   14
practices in all institutions, while also providing the necessary flexibility for institutions 
of different sizes.  The Mexican approach can only be implemented in systems with 
fewer and larger pension funds.  The Mexican approach merits consideration by countries 
with similar systems, although its effectiveness would need to be assessed in the coming 
years.  One of the issues that would need to be examined is whether the approach works 
well across different institutions, including institutions which are part of financial 
conglomerates owned by parent companies abroad – a very common situation in systems 
like the Chilean and the Mexican. 
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4. Risk-Based Solvency Standards 
The main elements of the solvency requirements for the four countries are 
summarized in Table 5. The Netherlands has developed the most structured and formal of 
these solvency regimes. This system originated with a set of solvency standards first 
developed in 1997 that were subsequently refined and introduced with the new Pensions   15
Act, effective on January 1, 2007.  The Dutch system includes a minimum solvency 
margin and solvency buffers designed to minimize the risk of under-funding due to 
longevity improvements or fluctuations in interest rates and asset prices. 
Liabilities (technical provisions) are measured with a mortality table that reflects 
predicted longevity improvements and a buffer to deal with unforeseen improvements.  
The discount rate used is the market yield curve measured by the Euro swap curve.  The 
interest rates used for discounting are only slightly higher than those in government 
bonds of equivalent duration, due to the high credit standing of banks operating in the 
market and the high market liquidity.   All pension funds must comply with a minimum 
solvency requirement equivalent to 5% of technical provisions.  However, funds must 
also build additional solvency buffers whose magnitude depends on the degree of asset-
liability mismatches, and that are designed to reduce the probability of under-funding to 
only 2.5% within a one year horizon.  For example, funds that invest more in equity, or 
fixed income assets with shorter duration than the duration of liabilities, or foreign 
currency assets, must maintain stronger buffers.   
In line with the approach followed in Basel II, pension funds may opt to comply with 
a standardized model or build their own internal models to compute their solvency 
requirements, although these models need to be approved by the supervisor.  In the 
standardized model, the solvency buffers are calculated through a stress test based on six 
broad risk factors and a formula for aggregate risk that takes partially into account 
correlations across asset classes.  The methodology implies that the typical Dutch fund 
will need to maintain a sizable buffer amounting to 30% of technical provisions.  To 
reduce the buffer, the fund will need to reduce the mismatch by, for example, shifting 
from equity to bonds or increasing the duration of the bond portfolio. 
The Dutch approach provides an incentive for pension funds to build their own 
internal models, because a more refined methodology and more accurate parameters will 
probably reduce the size of the required solvency buffer.  However, if pension funds 
decide to build their own models this may prove challenging to the supervisor, which will 
have to assess each of these models.
9 
Although pension funds may be able to reduce their solvency requirements by 
building their own models, the Dutch risk-based solvency rule has still been criticized for 
being too costly and not taking into consideration the possibility that long-run risks are 
lower due to lower correlations of asset classes over time or mean reversion of equity 
returns.
10  Dutch regulators clearly preferred to adopt a conservative view, while 
introducing an element of flexibility by allowing a relatively long period of 15 years for 
compliance. 
The Danish solvency requirements are slightly less specified but grounded on the 
same principles. As with the Netherlands, there is a minimum solvency margin based on 
the current valuation of liabilities that is supplemented by a stress test based on the 
composition of assets.  The stress test places each fund into one of three “traffic light” 
zones that indicate the current solvency position.  It is distinguished from the Dutch 
approach because it does not explicitly link remedial measures to the status of the funds 
but rather seeks to maintain funds within a solvency corridor through signaling devices 
and market pressures.  A solvency status is calculated for every institution twice a year 
and places each institution in one of three categories:  A green light for those deemed 
within acceptable solvency status, a yellow light for those determined to be in danger of   16
facing solvency problems and a red light for the institutions that face severe and 
immediate problems. 
 
Table 5: Risk-Based Solvency Requirements 
  Measurement of Liabilities (TPs) 
1 






Netherlands  Group specific 
mortality table 
adjusted for predicted 
longevity 
improvements, 
plus buffer to address 
uncertainty in 
predicted values  
Market yield curve 
measured by Euro 
swap curve 
5% of Technical Provisions 
(from EU IORP Directive) 
 
Measured once per year 




Maximum period for 
correction of deviations: 3 
years 
Maximum probability of under-
funding within one year 
measured with stress test: 2.5%
Solvency buffers determined by 
risk factors specific to each 
asset class. 
Example of risk factors include 
yearly decline in: 
Equity: 25-35% (depends on 
type) 
Currency: 20% 
Real Estate: 15% 
 
Maximum period for correction 
of deviations: 15 years 
 
Denmark  Fund-specific 
mortality table 
approved by actuary 
and supervisor 
 
Traffic light stress test 
includes assessment 
of the impact of a 5% 
improvement in 
longevity 
Market yield curve 
measured by Euro 
swap curve 
Solvency margin defined by 
EU Life Directive: 
4% of Technical Provision 
plus 0.3 % of risk bearing 
investments 
 
Measured every six months 
using current market values 
 
Period of correction from 
minimum required 
standards: 
One year  
Traffic light system is a stress 
test rather than part of the 
formal solvency rule, but results 
are taken into consideration in 
the supervisory assessment. 
Test defines three zones:  
green, yellow, and red 
Final outcome depends on 
whether entity remains solvent 
after test.   
Example (yearly variations) : 
Listed equity: 
Red 12%, Yellow 30% 
 Interest rate (medium duration)
 Red +- 0.85%; Yellow +-  1.2% 
Australia  No formal liabilities   
in DC plans 
No formal liabilities 
in DC plans 
No solvency requirements 
for DC plans 
No solvency requirements  
for DC plans 
Mexico  No formal liabilities   
in DC plans 
No formal liabilities 
in DC plans 
No formal solvency requirements, but Value at Risk (VaR)  
limit designed to limit downside risk for DC members 
Historic VaR calculated with rolling 550 day sample at 5% 
significance with different limits imposed on the two 
portfolios.  Price vector provided by 2 independent vendors 
Higher risk portfolio: 1% maximum daily loss  
Standard risk portfolio: 0.6% maximum daily loss 
Notes: 1/ TP = Technical Provisions 
 
Rather than impose a single potential scenario of adverse market conditions the 
Danish approach establishes two sets of parameters for each risk factor, which effectively 
imply a mild and a strong stress test.  If a fund is put into theoretical insolvency by the 
mild test it is deemed to be in the red zone.  In other words, funds in the red zone cannot   17
withstand even a moderate adverse shift in asset prices.  Those which remain 
theoretically solvent under the mild test but not the strong test are placed in the yellow 
zone.  For example, a decline in equities of 12% is posited for the red test and 30% for 
the yellow. The factors are 8% and 12% respectively for real estate.  Factors are also 
stipulated for varying duration of fixed income instruments, credit risk and others.  Funds 
which remain theoretically solvent after the strong test are put in the green zone. 
Failure to meet the yellow scenario is treated as an early warning indicator. An 
institution that receives a yellow light is placed under intensified supervision. The 
primary goal of intensified supervision is to increase the risk awareness of the 
management of the pension institution. When an institution receives a red light, it may be 
subjected to more drastic intervention.  The supervisor may order the institution 
concerned to take the measures necessary within a specified time limit if its financial 
position has deteriorated to such a degree that it puts the interests of policy holders and 
other affected parties at risk. 
A red light does not necessary imply that the institution will immediately be subject 
to crisis management. The supervisor will normally require monthly reporting from the 
institution as well as a commitment that it will not increase its overall risk exposure. If 
the institution remains in a red light situation for a prolonged period a reduction in risk 
will be required although measures to reduce risks and/or risk exposures are not specified 
in detail. However, action plans prepared by the institution concerned must be submitted 
to the supervisor. The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (DFSA) decides the 
maximum period for the restoration of the financial position, depending on the size of the 
shortfall and anticipated market developments. The DFSA is expected to monitor the 
performance of the operating plan and demand changes in the plan if the financial 
position of the institution suffers further deterioration. If the base capital of the pension 
institution is less than one-third of the solvency requirement or is less than the minimum 
capital requirement, the period for restoration of capital will be stated in months and will 
not normally exceed one year.  
Australia, which has rapidly transitioned to nearly an entirely DC based system over 
the past decade, does not incorporate explicit solvency requirements on the risks of DC 
fund portfolios.  However, the exposure to financial risks is captured in the risk scoring 
model, and the supervisor will check if the institution has the capacity to manage these 
risks.  If the institution proves to be unable to manage the risks associated with a more 
aggressive or complex portfolio it becomes subject to more intensive supervision. 
Mexico has taken an entirely different approach to volatility risk.  Within their DC 
system the relevant characteristic is the volatility of the value of member’s accounts 
rather than asset-liability balance.  While not strictly speaking a solvency measure in the 
traditional meaning, the parameters that Mexico requires their pension funds to remain 
within serve a similar purpose, to ensure the adequacy of the asset base and retain its 
fluctuations within a prescribed level.  This may be viewed as implicitly assuming a 
liability (or minimum return) for the pension system.  
The Mexican limitations are established in the form of a maximum permissible 
“value at risk” or VaR which the funds are permitted to have.  Mexico now permits two 
types of portfolios (Siefores) within each of the pension companies (Afores).  The 
standard portfolio established at the outset of the systems design is limited to a 
composition that is estimated through the methodology outlined below to be associated   18
with a maximum loss in a day of less than 0.6% of its value.  The higher risk/return 
portfolio that was recently introduced into the system must maintain a VaR of less than 
1.0%. 
The VaR is calculated by the supervisor on a daily basis, based on a rolling 500 day 
sample of the prices of all of the permissible assets.  The price vector is provided by two 
independent price vendors, to ensure a common valuation methodology and 
comparability.  The VaR is historic and calculated with a 5% level of significance for 
each portfolio (the individual portfolios are reported to the supervisor through automated 
systems). If any of the funds drifts outside of the permissible limits the supervisor is able 
to intervene and provide specific instructions regarding the reallocation required to move 
back within the prescribed standard.  This has not occurred yet, as the actual VaRs 
remain well below the ceilings, as shown in Figure 7 in the following Part V of this 
paper. 
5. Supervisory Risk Scoring Systems 
All supervisors gain an understanding of the risk profile of pension funds through 
their normal supervision activities.  Any basic supervision framework involves the 
collection of data from pension funds.  This can be as basic as the collection of annual 
accounts but more typically will involve collection of data through a set of standard 
forms designed by the supervisor and submitted by the pension funds on a regular basis.  
Through the analysis of collected data supervisors will have a picture of the financial 
strength of the funds.  This can be supplemented by the collection of additional 
information from on-site inspections and the market.  This information can be combined 
for the computation of overall risk scores for each institution.  The various risk scoring 
systems from the four countries reviewed are shown in Table 6.  
Australia was the first of the four countries to introduce a fully developed scoring 
system with the development in 2002 of a structured framework for risk assessment in 
pension funds known as the Probability and Impact Rating System (PAIRS).  The results 
of this structured methodology for ranking pension funds according to the relative threat 
of failure are then mapped into a supervisory response framework (SOARS).  The model 
makes a distinction between larger funds which are subject to detailed assessment and 
smaller funds which are subject to a streamlined and more automated assessment.   
Additional focus is also given to funds which are DB. 
APRA applies the same broad supervisory model to superannuation funds as to 
banks and insurance companies.  The analyst is asked to assess the significance of the 
risks and mitigating factors and to assess the extent to which each contributes to (for the 
inherent risk factors) or reduce (for the management and control areas) the overall risks 
of the fund.  Weighted numerical assessments are combined into an overall score.  This 
score is converted to a risk rating using a non-linear function to ensure that higher risk 
funds are given greater attention.  After taking into account an impact rating based on 
fund size, the scores are converted into a supervisory attention index which maps into a 
’supervisory stance’ and action plan.  In this way the rating directly defines how the 
supervisor will manage their relationship with the pension fund.  Funds in the ‘normal’ 
category are subject to regular supervision activities.  Those in ‘oversight’ category 
receive more intense monitoring and more frequent contact.  Funds rated for ‘mandated 
improvement’ are expected to develop and implement plans for improvement, while   19
those rated ‘restructure’ require strong enforcement action. The framework imposes a 
stronger analytical discipline to a still largely judgmental process and provides an audit 
trail to analyze and explain supervisory decisions and actions. It allows APRA to allocate 
more resources to institutions whose failure would have a greater impact on the financial 
system. 
In the Netherlands in 2005, the Dutch National Bank (DNB) introduced an integrated 
method for analyzing risk for all financial institutions known as the Financial Institutions 
Risk analysis Method (FIRM) which replaced the earlier pension and insurance specific 
system known as MARS. Like Australia, supervision in the Netherlands is based on the 
ongoing process of information collection, consultations with the supervised entities and 
a structured approach to the assessment of risk and the manner in which those risks are 
managed. Under the FIRM model, the DNB takes into account the assessment of 
solvency outlined earlier and combines this with an evaluation of the pension entity, the 
risks to which it is exposed and the quality of the risk management procedures in place.  
Like Australia, the results of the risk assessment become the basis for decisions regarding 
the nature and intensity of supervisory action. 
The FIRM model adopts a four-stage approach to building the risk assessment.  In 
the first step a detailed profile of the pension fund is constructed.  The second step 
identifies relevant management units and functions and assigns weights to these.  Using 
this functional breakdown the third step evaluates gross risks and assigns a score to this 
assessment.  In contrast to Australia, the Dutch system combines probability and impact 
into a single score within the system rather than assessing these separately, based on the 
view that the two elements are so closely related they should not be independently 
considered. The various types of risks identified in Australia and the Netherlands are very 
similar. The additional focus in the Netherlands on technical insurance and mismatch 
risks reflects the primarily DB nature of the pension system. 
The fourth step in the Netherlands seeks to obtain an insight into the quality of risk 
controls for each risk category to derive a final value that represent the net risks of the 
pension fund.  The aggregation of risks is based on a mathematical algorithm which puts 
emphasis on high risks and poor controls.  The reports which form part of the FIRM 
model form a basis for the planning of supervision activities.  The frequency of on-site 
inspections is determined largely by the risk profile of the fund.  During an on-site 
inspection data are collected which allow the FIRM model to be updated and high risk 
areas which have been identified are examined closely. 
Concurrent with the introduction of the VaR standards in 2002, the Mexican 
supervisory authority Consar has developed elements of a risk scoring model, in the form 
of early warning indicators for assessing operational and financial risks.  The current 
methodology entails three risk factors – low, medium and high – and gives emphasis to 
irregularities detected during supervision activity.  Reflecting the fact that Mexico 
operates a DC system it is not surprising that the main weaknesses identified relate to 
internal controls and the collection of contributions. Supervision strategies are focused on 
the most critical areas identified by the early warning system.  However, Consar is in the 
process of incorporating other elements of risk into the VaR, such as credit risk, and 
assessing how it can make greater use of the VaR results for risk scoring. 
Denmark has also developed elements of a risk scoring model, in the form of an 
internal rating system with three internal quality scores covering organization, procedures   20
and internal controls, as well as ratings on insurance risks which mainly cover longevity 
risk exposure of the different institutions.   The DFSA combines these internal score or 
early warning indicators with the traffic light results, to guide the intensity and scope of 
supervisory activity.  
 
Table 6:  Risk Scoring Methods 
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6. Market Based Discipline and Third Parties 
 
The importance of market discipline in risk-based supervision depends 
fundamentally on the type of pension system, and the extent to which supervisors ensure 
disclosure and enhance the roles of third parties such as the external auditor.  In general, 
the market discipline pillar is more relevant in open pension systems that allow selection 
of the provider.  Even in these cases, however, the supervisor must ensure proper 
accounting, auditing, and disclosure rules ensuring the access of fund members and 
market analysis to relevant and accurate information. 
As shown in Table 7, all the four countries have adopted market valuation of balance 
sheets.  While this is a standard feature of DC systems, such as the Australian and the 
Mexican, it has only recently been introduced in the Netherlands and Denmark.   In all 
the countries external auditors need to verify the accuracy of financial statements.  In 
Australia and Mexico, their role is expanded to include an assessment of the quality of 
risk management systems.  In all four countries external auditors have “whistle-blowing” 
obligations, i.e. they are required to report material problems to the supervisor. 
Mexico imposes extensive disclosure requirements, including monthly disclosure of 
individual portfolios, returns, fees, and VaRs.  Denmark discloses annually a large 
number of performance and solvency indicators of individual providers, allowing for 
direct comparisons of performance.  The Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission has detailed product disclosure requirements for funds which allow 
members to direct their investment strategies.  However, disclosure requirements on fund 
performance remain comparatively less extensive in Australia, a somewhat surprising 
result considering that members have been recently allowed to switch across pension 
funds.  The less demanding disclosure requirements in the Netherlands are expected, 
reflecting the closed nature of the Dutch system. 
Overall, the market discipline pillar seems to play a more important role in Mexico 
and Denmark, followed by Australia and the Netherlands.  Mexico would seem to meet 
all the requirements for a strong third pillar, although the benefit guarantee extended to 
older workers probably weakens market discipline (Bernstein and Chumacero (2007)).  
The Danish system also assigns an important role for the third pillar, as indicated by the 
comprehensive disclosure requirements. 
Australia has recently extended the scope of external audits to include an assessment 
of the quality of risk management systems.  The extent to which external auditors can 
perform this task effectively is open to question, but the fact that regulations include this 
obligation reveals the intention to increase the importance of third party monitoring.   
Moreover, the recent decision to allow members to switch funds may increase pressure 
for more disclosure in the future.  In the Netherlands, disclosure requirements are less 
extensive, although the obligation for single sponsors to reflect the situation of their funds 
in their balance sheets may introduce an important element of market discipline. 
 
 




Table 7:  Role of Market Discipline, Third Parties, Disclosure 
Selected Auditing Rules     Accounting Rules 
Scope of Audit  Accountability 
Disclosure Requirements
Netherlands  Fair valuation of 
assets and liabilities 
Financial Statements  Whistle blowing 
obligations 
Single employer  funds 
included on balance sheet 
of sponsor  
Denmark  Fair valuation of 
assets and liabilities 
Financial Statements  Whistle blowing 
obligations to 
supervisor authority 
for “material” issues 
Extensive disclosure of 
individual indicators of 
efficiency and solvency – 
key performance 
indicators – on supervisors 
website 
Australia  Net market value 
for assets 
Financial Statements 





Operating statement and 
statement of financial 
position for all funds 












Extensive disclosure of 
individual investment 
policies, fees, returns,  
and VaRs 
 
7. Internal Structure of the Supervision Agency 
The supervisory agencies of the four countries include one which is responsible 
solely for supervising retirement savings (Mexico), two independent integrated 
supervisors (Australia and Denmark) and one where the central bank serves as an 
integrated financial supervisory authority (the Netherlands). 
In Mexico, Consar was initially focused on collecting information and ensuring 
compliance with the rules and regulations, particularly the tight controls over investment.  
In the past few years it has undergone an internal reorganization to allow it to more 
effectively implement a risk-based approach to supervision. The main supervision 
activities have been separated into operational and financial areas under two separate 
vice-presidencies.  Consar has been building up its technical capabilities to assess the 
impact of VaR models and enable assessment of the risk management practices within 
the pension fund managers. 
The Danish FSA was established in its present form as an integrated financial sector 
regulator in1988.  Major segments of the financial industry are supervised in different 
divisions.  The Life and Pensions Division is one of ten divisions responsible for 
supervision and regulatory techniques.  Staff in this division takes part in off-site 
surveillance and on-site inspections.  This Division was responsible for developing the 
traffic light stress test, in close collaboration with the Banking Division which had 
developed expertise in this area. 
Within the Dutch National Bank, supervision is organized around several operating 
directorates aligned with particular types of institution such as conglomerates, banks,   23
insurance companies and pension funds.  Each division is supported by a supervisory 
policy division with responsibilities across all types of institutions and by centers of 
expertise in specialist areas such as “Asset-Liability Management”.  The development of 
FIRM has involved representatives from all supervisory divisions but is owned by a 
Division Director from one of the supervisory divisions. An expert team comprising 
representatives from all operational divisions is responsible for ensuring that the system 
is updated as required. 
Within APRA, supervision follows a more integrated model in which staff can have 
responsibility for several types of financial institutions.  In their supervisory and 
analytical work analysts responsible for routine supervision are supported by specialists 
in credit, market and operational risk and can draw on actuarial support.  A separate 
group within the Policy and Research Division provides technical support for the 
PAIRS/SOARS model, and collects data on risk rating for regular reporting to 
management and the Executive Team within APRA. 
 
V. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF RBS  
 
This section provides some initial observations that can be gleaned from the limited 
information available about the changes that are associated with the adoption of risk-
based supervision.  It is important to stress that any assessment must be seen as 
preliminary, because these new supervisory systems have been introduced very recently 
and are designed to control pension systems whose outcomes in relation to the ability to 
deliver retirement benefits for a typical member extend across many decades. 
1. The Netherlands 
The new Dutch supervisory paradigm is primarily directed to the resiliency of the 
solvency of DB pension plans. Although not formally imposed until very recently, both 
the FIRM scoring system and the solvency standards had similar antecedents in prior 
systems that were either announced or put into practice over the past four to five years, a 
period likely to be sufficient for underlying effects to begin to come to light. These risk-
based approaches potentially impose significant costs, especially the new risk-based 
solvency rules.  These new rules may induce funds to change their strategic asset 
allocation, increase contribution rates, reduce benefits, or implement a combination of all 
these solutions.  They may also induce employers to stop sponsoring DB plans altogether 
and move towards less onerous DC plans.  
Despite these increasing risks to plan sponsors, which in other countries such as the 
UK and US have resulted in a massive substitution of DC arrangements and some decline 
in coverage, neither of these can be observed in the Netherlands. The overall coverage 
rate remains above 90%, one of the highest in the world, and the total number of 
members has remained essentially unchanged since 2004.  Virtually all of these remain 
DB plans, with DC plan coverage showing an increase from 2.3 to 3.6 percent of 
members between 2004 and 2006.  This seeming resiliency of the DB system to 
regulatory encroachment must be considered in the context of a system founded in 
collectively bargained industry wide arrangements that, at a minimum, are likely to be 
insulated from changes in form over the short term. The only possible effect that can be 
observed in the aggregate data is a decline in the number of funds from over 1,000 in the 
late 1990s to 860 in 2004 and 798 in 2006.  This reduction may reflect the higher costs   24
imposed by the new system that make small funds less viable, but it may reflect other 
causes as well.  In any case, another five years may be required to conclusively observe 
any effects of the new rules on coverage, plan selection, and fund size. 
What has happened more clearly in recent years are dramatic changes in the 
secondary aspects of pension scheme characteristics.  While much of this is likely related 
to broader pressures of population aging to some extent they may be interpreted partially 
as a process of hedging risk exposure in response to the new more stringent solvency 
measures.  The proportion of Dutch pension funds that provide benefits based on final 
pay has declined from 54% in 2002 just prior to the initial introduction of risk-based rules 
to about 10%.  A less marked increase in the incidence of conditional indexing of 
promised benefits to price levels has occurred from 90% in 2002 to an almost universal 
98% in 2006 although there was very little room for movement in this indicator.  
As mentioned before, another area to observe the impact of the new supervisory 
system is in the investment patterns of funds. Two effects were generally posited in 
response to rules that impose high costs for asset-liability mismatches.  These are a 
movement away from equities to fixed income and increases in the duration of fixed 
income portfolios.  As shown in Table 8, the aggregate balance sheet information on 
pension funds does not appear to support the first of these expectations.  The available 
evidence does however seem to indicate the second expected impact – the lengthening of 
the duration of the fixed income portfolios to better manage the mismatch exposure that 
is exacerbated with the volatility of the new market based discount rate.  As shown in 
Figure 3, from the end of 2003 to the end of 2005 average duration increased by a year to 
more than 6 years with some funds moving to much longer durations. 
It is possible that pension portfolios will become more conservative in the future, as 
pension funds build their internal models and reassess in more detail the impact of the 
new rules on their solvency position.  At the same time, the absence of more pronounced 
shifts in strategic asset allocation could also be due to the long period of compliance.  As 
mentioned before, pension funds are allowed 15 years to address shortfalls in the required 
solvency buffers.  This relatively long period of compliance introduces a necessary 




Table 8: Asset Allocation of Dutch Pension Funds 2001 – 2005 (in % of total) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Land  and  buildings  11% 11% 10% 10% 10% 
Investments,  non-consolidated  1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 
Shares and other variable yield securities   42%  35%  40%  40%  42% 
Bonds and other fixed yield securities   36%  41%  39%  40%  40% 
Mortgage  loans  3% 4% 3% 3% 2% 
Private  loans    5% 3% 2% 2% 1% 
Deposits  0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
Other  investments    2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 
Liquid  assets    1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Total    (Euro  millions)  460,777 427,297 481,811 542,112 624,881 
Source:  DNB data and authors calculations 
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Figure 3: Distribution of the Duration of Dutch Pension Fund Fixed Income Investments 
 
Source: Kakes and Broeders, “The sustainability of the Dutch pension system”  DNB Occasional Studies, Vol. 4 
No. 6, 2006   p 41 
 
2. Denmark 
The introduction of the risk-based approach to supervision occurred just prior to the 
decline of interest rates and the drop in equity prices in 2001-2002, making it difficult to 
distinguish the effects of the introduction of the new system from external factors. 
Immediately after the introduction of the more risk oriented rules, pension institutions 
suffered huge losses on their equity portfolios, while the present value of technical 
provisions increased dramatically. A very high proportion of contracts had been issued 
with guaranteed returns.  Guaranteed rates were lowered by two-thirds in two stages over 
the 1990s, but pension institutions continued to be exposed to the residual high-rate 
contracts for both past and future contributions that could still be made under the terms of 
the previous contracts.  
The mismatch between assets and liabilities was aggravated by the presence of large 
investments in mortgage bonds with embedded call options. As borrowers exercised their 
option to refinance their mortgages with lower interest rates, pension institutions did not 
experience an increase in the market value of their bond holdings. In this situation, a 
large number of institutions found themselves in the yellow light zone under the new 
traffic light system, while some were even in the red light zone. For a few companies the 
situation turned out to be so severe that they encountered real problems in fulfilling their 
solvency requirements and they were placed under special supervision by the authorities. 
As shown in Table 9 and Figure 4, pension institutions reacted to the financial crisis 
and the new stress testing by reducing the proportion of equities following two years of 
substantially negative returns in 2001 and 2002.  They also began to close the duration 
gap that had led to the deterioration of their solvency position by increasing investment in 
foreign bonds which offer longer durations.  The institutions also began to engage in 
extensive hedging operations, mostly through the use of long-term interest rate swaps in 
the more liquid Euro market
12. Although such policies ran the risk of "locking-in the 
losses", it was generally accepted that under the new solvency standards pension 
institutions could not afford to suffer additional losses and further endanger their 
position.    26
 
Table 9:  Changes in the Asset Allocation of Life Companies and Pension Funds 
 Domestic  Foreign  Domestic Foreign Investment  Other 
  Bonds Bonds  Equities  Equities Trusts  Assets 
1998 54.4  1.3  13.4  12.3  1.9    16.7 
1999 46.6  2.1  12.6  18.3  3.5    17.0 
2000 44.7  4.8  11.3  18.5  4.6    16.1 
2001 45.1  10.7  8.6  12.5  6.3    16.8 
2002 53.0  13.6  4.6  6.9  6.2    15.7 
2003 51.3  12.4  4.4  8.0  8.1    15.8 
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The increased use of derivatives and the changes in strategic asset allocation 
significantly improved the position of pension funds in relation to unfavorable interest 
rate movements, as indicated in the simulations shown in Table 10. While in 2001 and 
2002, an interest rate fall of 1 percentage point produced a net loss of more than DKK 15 
billion, the new portfolio structure had transformed a negative 100 basis point decline 
into an estimated net gain of DKK 15 billion in 2003 and DKK 8 billion in 2004.    27
 
Table 10: Simulation Results of Change in Interest Rates 
Year Change  Liabilities  Assets  AL  Gains  Derivatives  Net  Gains 
    DKK bn  DKK bn  DKK bn  DKK bn  DKK bn 
         
2001  -1%  -65.0  49.4  -15.6  -15.6 
2002 -1%  -66.6  26.7  -39.9  25.1  -14.8 
2003 -1%  -52.0  40.2  -11.8  26.9  15.1 
2004 -1%  -76.1  40.7  -35.4  43.8  8.4 
Source: Ladekarl et al, 2006 
 
In addition to these changes in asset allocation, there were also other important 
changes in the rules for profit distribution (the Danish system is dominated by risk-
sharing or profit-sharing policies, as mentioned before).  Until recently, most institutions 
set the rate of profit distribution to clients one year ahead. This rate was an important 
competitive parameter among pension institutions. However, after 2002, many 
institutions introduced a variable rate of profit distribution that depends on investment 
performance during the year. This more flexible approach made it easier for institutions 
to meet their obligations, but coupled with the substantial reduction in guaranteed rates of 
return it created considerable uncertainty in the eyes of policyholders.  
Overall, the introduction of risk-based supervision in Denmark has led institutions to 
reduce their asset-liability mismatches through changes in asset allocation and greater use 
of derivatives.  One important consequence of these adjustments has been the decline in 
the expected rate of return on the portfolio and the decreased enthusiasm of providers to 
offer benefit guarantees.  The greater use of derivatives has apparently helped companies 
reduce asset-liability mismatches at a reasonable cost but does not seem to have been able 
to arrest a decline in the expected rate of return. Interestingly, new clients have been 
more willing to take more risk in exchange for a higher expected return, as indicated by 
the growth of unit-linked and other products that are offered without any guarantees or 
with reduced levels of guarantee.  Therefore, the Danish system seems to be moving 
towards a more traditional DC system with fewer guarantees. 
These trends seem to contradict the conclusion of other researchers, that the use of 
derivatives (especially long-term interest swaps) has allowed Danish companies to 
address the mismatches and also preserve returns.
  13  On the contrary, the available 
evidence suggests that the new risk-based rules have induced pension funds to hold more 
conservative portfolios and lower guarantees, and that young members are favoring 
contracts that entail higher expected returns and more volatility.  This is an area that 
should merit more research, as it would throw more light on the impact of risk-based 
supervision on portfolio strategies. 
3. Australia 
There are two main elements to changes in the risk-based supervisory framework in 
Australia which have had an impact on superannuation (pension) funds over the past few 
years.  The first to be introduced was the PAIRS/SOARS framework. The second was the 
introduction of a comprehensive licensing framework for all superannuation funds. 
The PAIRS/SOARS framework was intended to improve APRA's supervisory 
performance and not directly impact on the industry. APRA assesses the timeliness and   28
effectiveness of its intervention, by tracking the migration of institutions between the 
different supervisory stances.  In the three years since the model was introduced the great 
majority of institutions in ‘Mandated Improvement’ or ‘Restructure’ at some point over 
this period have either improved or exited the industry, with no entity failures. Of the 168 
institutions that have been in these two stances, 57 have improved, 16 remain in their 
SOARS category, one has been downgraded and 94 have exited
14. APRA does not 
separately publish this data for superannuation funds but has confirmed that around 100 
have been superannuation funds. These figures suggest that these tools have made APRA 
more effective, but they have mainly helped industry by removing or strengthening the 
weakest entities. 
The second major change has been the introduction of superannuation licensing. At 
the beginning of the licensing transition period there were more than 1,700 trustees 
operating. By the end of the licensing transition period 307 trustee licenses had been 
issued (with about twice as many registered funds).   This consolidation had begun many 
years before APRA introduced licensing, but this measure clearly hastened industry 
consolidation and generated a move towards corporate superannuation outsourcing. In 
order to be granted a license trustees had to demonstrate that they meet the required 
minimum standards of risk and were well placed to provide beneficiaries with greater 
levels of safety and security for their superannuation accounts. New operating standards 
concerning fitness and propriety, risk management, adequacy of resources and 
outsourcing proved challenging to meet and many trustees have left the industry. 
One of the reasons for reform of superannuation was to create a more professional 
industry where risk management standards, particularly for operational risk, were 
substantially improved. In its most recent annual report APRA notes that a regulated 
superannuation fund (excluding small funds) now manages, on average, over seven times 
the level of assets it managed five years ago, a period in which total superannuation 
assets have less than doubled. Superannuation funds have grown in terms of size, 
complexity and growing sophistication of risk management and the industry more closely 
resembles the other industries which APRA regulates. 
Among those trustees that have exited have been some generally smaller entities 
with problematic investments involving highly undiversified portfolios (sometimes 
dominated by a handful of illiquid assets) and related party and employer-linked 
transactions.  However there has been little impact on broader investment strategies or 
any observable changes in the investment composition of the industry. 
APRA suggests that the implementation of PAIRS/SOARS has resulted in more 
consistent supervisory outcomes by allowing for a better calibration of APRA's reaction 
to supervisory issues across a large number of institutions and supervisors. The primary 
source of information for a PAIRS assessment is based on the findings from supervision 
activities.  Any requirements placed on superannuation funds and recommendations for 
changes in behavior or systems generally arise from these finding rather than from a 
particular PAIRS rating. However, while PAIRS does not mandate those changes on an 
institution per se it is very useful in calibrating the impact of these changes on the overall 
risk profile of a fund.  Industry has indicated that improved consistency enhances its 
confidence in APRA’s methods and procedures.   29
4. Mexico 
As mentioned before, the search for efficiency gains and the concern with extreme 
portfolio losses were two important factors that motivated the adoption of risk-based 
supervision in Mexico.  The relaxation of portfolio restrictions (including the permission 
to use derivatives) combined with stricter risk management requirements was intended to 
lead to more efficient outcomes while the exposure of individuals to downside risk would 
be contained by the VaR limit.  
The impact of the regulatory changes is assessed by examining the resulting shifts in 
the efficient frontier and the actual changes in portfolio strategies.  Consar (2006) 
provides estimates of the efficient frontier for every year when the investment regime 
was liberalized.  These estimates indicate that the frontier has been expanded quite 
substantially, especially in 2004, when there was another round of changes combined 
with the introduction of the VaR ceiling.  Figure 5 illustrates the shift in the frontier 
resulting from the latest round of changes.  The expansion of the frontier resulting from a 
relaxation of portfolio controls is expected and consistent with estimates for other 
countries, such as Chile.
15 However, whether the expansion of the frontier has led to 
more efficient outcomes is a more complex question. 
It is clear that pension fund managers have made use of the greater freedom by 
moving away from very basic portfolios, and investing more in domestic and foreign 
equity, as well as foreign fixed income instruments.  As shown in Table 11, the share of 
public sector bonds has declined from almost 100 percent to 75 percent, and the share of 
higher yield, privately-issued domestic and foreign assets, has increased commensurately.  
The average maturity and duration of the fixed income portfolio has also increased 
significantly, as shown in Figure 6.  These portfolio shifts are reflected in risk-return 
combinations that are higher and to the right, as shown in Figure 5. The portfolio shifts 
are also reflected in the increasing VaRs, although VaRs remain well below the ceiling, 
as shown in Figure 7. 
The outcomes are positive overall, as there has been a diversification away from a 
very basic and low return portfolio consisting primarily of government securities with 
short durations.  However, there is no evidence of gains in the risk-return trade-off, 
strictly defined as a decrease in risk for the same return, or an increase in return for the 
same levels of risk.  This is not surprising, as pension funds were basically investing in 
the risk-free portfolio. The right and upward movements in risk-return combinations and 
the increase in VaRs must be interpreted in this context.  Even after these initial shifts, 
portfolios remain undiversified relative to pension funds in other countries and VaRs 
remain well below the ceiling.  All in all, the conclusion is that the new approach has 
produced positive outcomes, but these cannot be interpreted as an efficiency gain in the 
strict sense.  It is simply too early to make an assessment of whether the new approach is 
able to produce more efficient outcomes, relative to a regulatory regime that relies more 
heavily on portfolio controls, or relative to a regime like the Australian, that does not 
impose VaR ceilings, and that  emphasizes sound risk management without imposing 
prescriptive regulations. 
A critical question in Mexico is how portfolio managers will build their strategies 
once the actual VaRs approach the limits.  Mexican supervisors have the power to 
increase the VaR limits if they conclude that the current ones excessively limit pension 
fund managers.  However, a more fundamental question is whether VaR limits are the   30
best approach for influencing the investment policies of DC pension funds and achieving 
efficient outcomes in the long-run.  The application of VaRs for pension funds remains 
controversial, as there are well-known arguments against the adoption of a short run risk 
measure for institutional investors that should operate with a long time horizon.
16  
Whereas the Mexican approach is innovative and attractive in many aspects, including 
the objective of containing downside risk, assessing its effectiveness will require a longer 
period and comparisons with the outcomes generated by other approaches to risk-based 
supervision of DC plans, such as the Australian. 
 
Table 11: Average Composition of the Aggressive Pension Portfolio in Mexico (Siefores 2) 
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Government  Bonds  92.6 89.8 85.5 84.5 85.5 86.1 76.5 
Corporate  Bonds  5.4  7.8 12.3  11.0 9.6  7.8  6.6 
Financial  Institutions  Bonds  2.0 2.4 2.1 4.5 4.9 4.0 4.9 
Domestic  Equity        0.5  2.0 
Foreign  Assets        1.6  10.0 
   Fixed Income            0.6  4.2 
   Equity            1.0  5.8 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 Source: Consar 
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Figure 6: Maturity of the Public Debt Stock and Government Securities in the Riskier Portfolio 
(Dec 05, 01)
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VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS  
 
Review of the four early adopters of risk-based supervision for pension systems 
illustrates the potential for the application of these principles and methods across the full 
range of pension system designs. The nearly exclusively DB system operated by not-for-
profit institutions in the Netherlands, the traditional DC employer sponsored funds in 
Australia, commercial pension institutions in Mexico and a hybrid system with   32
guarantees in Denmark have all made progress in introducing risk-based standards and 
procedures. The experience of these early adopters provides a number of observations 
and lessons that are useful to consider as other countries begin to move in this direction. 
Risk-based supervision as it has emerged for banks and insurance companies is most 
readily transplanted to defined benefit pension systems such as that of the Netherlands.  
This is because the types of risk and associated methods that focus on solvency 
measurement and asset liability matching are quite similar. The presence of return 
guarantees such as in Denmark create some convergence of principles but require more 
adaptations. 
Application to DC systems such as Mexico and Australia impose the greatest 
challenges. Transferring investment risk to members requires the formulation of 
alternative financial risk concepts.  Mexico has been innovative in applying the concept 
of VAR as an attempt to contain downside losses.  This remains controversial due to the 
limited linkages between such a short term measure and the longer horizon of pensions. 
This technique may involve trade-offs between security and optimizing long term returns. 
Australia has side stepped this challenge by simply incorporating process based 
investment standards into its broader risk scoring techniques. However, this is only a 
viable option in systems grounded in well established and supervised financial service 
providers.  Development of income replacement targets for which a fund member might 
aim, and scenarios based on contributions and returns, perhaps offer potential future 
enhancements to both of these approaches. 
The use of comprehensive risk scoring models appears to offer considerable promise 
for pension supervision.  Moreover, there is a high potential for establishing generic 
models that are applicable to a number of financial institutions, which provide strong 
support for the integration of financial institution supervision.  A consistent approach to 
the design of risk scoring systems has emerged among the various countries that will 
provide a useful template for others to follow. Scoring systems appear to offer 
considerable potential for inducing an improvement in the quality of internal risk 
management as well, although pension supervisors may still need to complement the use 
of risk scoring models with direct regulations on risk management.  Scoring systems also 
offer the promise of establishing sophisticated metrics to guide the allocation of 
supervisory resources and through public disclosure a strong basis to leverage market 
discipline. 
There has been only limited progress to date in utilizing enhanced disclosure and 
market competition to improve the efficiency and security of pension funds.  Although 
very sophisticated risk scoring and evaluation techniques have been developed in three of 
the countries and are in the process of being implemented in Mexico, ratings are not 
disclosed to the market.  Denmark remains at the vanguard of this process but limits this 
to summary solvency indicators rather than the underlying analysis.  The Netherlands 
limit disclosure of their risk management scores to the pension funds.  Australia does not 
even disclose to a fund its rating, although funds will notice the changes in supervisory 
stance which would accompany a rating change.  This perhaps reflects a need for a 
continuing adaptation of the tools derived from banking to the different context of 
pensions.  Indeed, whereas supervisors rarely release a bank’s rating for fear of causing a 
“run” on weaker institutions, there may be scope for being more open in disclosing   33
ratings for pension funds in order to strengthen market discipline and promote sound risk 
management.
17 
Evidence of the impact of risk-based methods is preliminary at best and it remains 
far too early to draw any decisive conclusions. There is no indication of loss of pension 
coverage in any setting and other measurable effects have been largely at the margins.  
Funding ratios in the Netherlands and Denmark have improved, but this would probably 
have occurred in any event due to the recovery of the asset markets coincident with the 
adoption of the new methods. Portfolios in the Netherlands and Denmark have become 
more conservative and exhibit indications of better duration matching.  In both countries 
pension funds seem to be looking for more flexibility in order to reduce their solvency 
requirements.  Dutch funds seem to be making greater use of conditional indexation.  
Danish funds are offering a greater variety of products, and new entrants seem to favor 
unit-linked products with lower guarantees but offering prospects of higher returns.  This 
can be interpreted as a movement away from pure defined benefit systems, which is 
much more pronounced in the Danish case, but there are no hard data to make a decisive 
conclusion. 
Some observers remain confident that the use of derivatives will increasingly allow 
pension institutions in the Netherlands and Denmark to hedge their risks at a reasonable 
cost without unduly sacrificing returns.  However, it is too early to conclude that the new 
risk-based methods are indeed resulting in lower returns and a move away from defined 
benefits system and/or guarantees.  It is also too early to assess the extent to which 
derivatives will allow pension funds to hedge their risks without sacrificing returns.  In 
the two countries, the movements in pension portfolios and their implication for long-run 
return performance will need to be carefully assessed in the next few years. 
In Australia the introduction of the risk scoring model in conjunction with stronger 
licensing standards has accentuated the ongoing trend away from DB plans and has led to 
the consolidation of the industry, as smaller funds have increasingly been absorbed by 
larger entities.  However, this is likely due to a broader set of factors with adoption of 
risk-based supervision hard to distinguish. In Mexico it is simply too early to draw any 
conclusions because the system remains in a formative stage.  The early evidence 
provides promising indications of a more diversified portfolio associated with the 
relaxation of asset allocation requirements in favor of risk-based measures.  However, the 
applicability of short term VaR measures remains controversial, and it is difficult to 
assess how investment policies will evolve in the longer run, as the actual VaRs approach 
their ceilings. 
A variety of difficult challenges will need to be addressed as these risk-based 
systems evolve.  Both the Dutch and Danish systems implicitly place little reliance on the 
possibility of mean reversion in equity markets by utilizing fixed parameters in their 
stress testing.  It is possible that solvency buffers will prove excessive and costly. This 
issue is partially addressed through the 15 year adjustment period for compliance with 
solvency requirements and the ability of funds in the Netherlands to propose their own 
stress testing methodology. In Denmark, the fact that the traffic light system is not a 
formal solvency requirement also introduces an element of flexibility.  It remains to be 
seen whether the two countries have achieved the right balance between solvency 
protection and flexibility in the system.  Likewise, the capacity of the supervisor to   34
effectively evaluate individual internal solvency models will provide useful lessons for 
others contemplating similar elements to achieve efficient outcomes through flexibility.  
There are related issues in the mechanics of the methods. For practical (and likely 
political reasons) the solvency standards that are in use are based on retrospective 
measures of asset class volatility. This can potentially create price distortions and unduly 
limit innovation and the emergence of new instruments and may not accurately reflect the 
nature of some potential investment categories.  For practical purposes, the mark to 
market pricing requirements of these standards effectively limits pension funds to assets 
with observable prices. The tradeoff between gains from the transparency of market 
discipline arising from such standards will have to be very carefully considered in 
relation to the longer term constraint on risk return efficiency of overall portfolios.  This 
limits pension funds capacity to pursue the illiquidity premiums available in some types 
of investments (e.g. private equity, private placements) that are often perceived as 
advantageous to pension funds due to their relatively minimal liquidity requirements. 
Three more general challenges are also important in considering the utility of risk-
based approaches. Most fundamental is the applicability of the risk standards to the 
inherent nature of pension funds. Thus far these have no direct linkage to a fully 
articulated concept of retirement income adequacy.  There is no empirical basis for the 
1% daily VaR in Mexico that considers how much return and volatility over the multiple 
decade investment time horizon of the typical participant is appropriate. The 97.5% 
probability standard in the Dutch FTK does not have any direct foundation in the capacity 
of pension funds to remain solvent over the long term, a criticism that was well voiced 
during the consultation period. Similarly, to the extent these are based on a perceived 
“average” member of the fund they may be poorly aligned with the diverse requirements 
of members with widely varying time horizons and or differing risk appetites.  In this 
respect, risk parameters would have to be calibrated to multiple portfolios or the varying 
financial circumstances of funds sponsors which may so complicate matters that the 
transparency and capacity to administer the system is lost. 
A second general problem is that the solvency standards are potentially pro-cyclical 
in nature. Funds holding more volatile assets will have incentives to sell these when faced 
with market fluctuations.  If pension funds are sufficiently large these can become a 
potentially self reinforcing cycles that exacerbates instability and ultimately limit the 
potential diversification and therefore risk management capacity of the funds. 
Finally, the political economy of the risk-based supervision of pension funds remains 
untested.  By their very nature these approaches presume that some level of risk is 
appropriate for pension funds and seek to calibrate their parameters to this standard level.  
None have yet to weather the kind of “perfect storm” of nearly simultaneous asset 
meltdowns and interest rate collapse or contagion effects that were associated with their 
introduction.  It remains to be seen whether politicians will be able to sustain reasonable 
risks when the real losses to member’s accounts are incurred or will retreat into the mode 
of absolute security at any cost when faced with angry pensioners marching on the 
streets.  In principle, even an event with a probability as low as 2.5% will occur within 
the period in which an individual is involved with the pension system. 
Despite these challenges, risk-based supervision methods are likely to continue to 
gain acceptance, as they offer the prospect of advantages relative to other approaches.  
They provide a forward looking paradigm around which to organize supervision that   35
                                                     
offers the promise of reduced risk of insolvency of DB funds and potential efficiency 
gains in DC systems that impose investment restrictions.  They potentially provide a 
common framework to assess the relative risks of DC funds that function in a “prudent 
person” investment regime.  However, as in all such matters, there is likely to be no free 
lunch. Risk-based supervision systems may lead to more conservative portfolios in DB 
funds and constrain DC funds to a presumed average risk tolerance, depending on how 
they are designed.  The ability to use derivatives may to some extent mitigate these 
outcomes but this is not applicable to all countries. Risk-based methods will enable 
supervisors to better allocate their scarce resources, although they will also impose new 
technical requirements and a higher level of sophistication from all parties. The further 
development of these systems will be closely monitored and undoubtedly will provide 
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